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Abstract
Microgrids are being increasingly adopted in
electric power distribution systems to facilitate
distributed energy resource integration and to provide
resilient operations. Modern microgrids rely on
sophisticated cyber communications and controls
to maintain stable operation. Attacks on this cyber
infrastructure can cause the system to undertake a
potentially destabilizing control action. In this work, we
present the results of a reachability analysis in which we
determine whether a potential attack vector can result
in actions that make an unstable state “reachable” in
some time interval from the current state. Specifically,
our analysis must be executed on a timescale that heads
off the destabilizing system states due to malicious
attacks. To that end, we propose a sensitivity analysis
that assesses the worst-case impact of attack scenarios
of interest while identifying reachable unstable states
in the required time budget. This concept can be used
to develop a tool to support DER control decisions
under adverse conditions. Numerical tests are provided
to validate the effectiveness of the attack reachability
analysis.
1. Introduction
Microgrids (MGs) are increasingly being introduced
in distribution networks to promote the integration
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of distributed energy resources (DERs) and elastic
loads, coupled with a significant modernization of
metering, computing, and communication infrastructure
[1]. Meanwhile, MGs’ ability to operate in two modes,
i.e., islanded and grid-connected, further enhances
system reliability and resiliency against disturbances in
the bulk power networks [2].
However, deployment of MGs requires a hierarchical
control framework that includes sensors, actuators, and
other intelligent control components communicating
over a cyber network, to perform functions such as
the distributed voltage and frequency controls in [3–6].
Consequently, there are growing concerns about the
stable and reliable operation of MGs where vulnerability
to cyber attacks on communication, measurement, and
control systems poses significant threats; see, e.g.,
[7–11] and references therein. Such attacks are not
hypothetical, as evidenced by recent cyber-induced
outages in Ukrainian power systems [9]. Accordingly,
there is a pressing need to develop an online analytic
tool to continuously monitor for and predict the
potential impact of cyber attacks on MGs while offering
preventive countermeasures. Such a tool would be
important in providing decision support for DER
coordination under adversarial environments.
There have been active research efforts to address the
cybersecurity concerns with MGs. Real-time simulators
such as RTDS and testbeds have been used to analyze
the impact of malicious cyber events and test real-time
hardware-in-the-loop systems [12–14]. In addition,
prior work in [10, 15, 16] has developed defense
frameworks and countermeasures against malicious
attacks. Nonetheless, prior efforts have fallen short
of continuously monitoring and predicting potential
cybersecurity impacts. Accordingly, repeated numerical
simulations, such as Monte Carlo methods, have been
proposed to analyze the impact of cyber attacks on
MG dynamic states, e.g, angle and frequency [17–
20]. From a practical point of view, those numerical
simulations are computationally burdensome when all
possible attack scenarios are considered. To the
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best of our knowledge, none of the prior work can
be implemented in a real-time setting that reflects
the physical structure of MGs directly related to the
dynamical stability of the system. Thus, we aim to
improve the computational feasibility of the analysis
while facilitating the protection of systems from cyber
attacks in a nearly online fashion.
Aligned with the need for comprehensive methods
to improve the cybersecurity of MGs, we propose a
sensitivity-based reachability analysis to quantify the
impact of cyber attacks on measurement and control
commands to transient stability of MGs. This study
provides the worst-case upper and lower bounds on
dynamic states (voltage and frequency) under a specified
attack. By reachability, we mean that an unstable state
is “reachable” from the current state in the presence
of particular attacks. Henceforth, our analysis may be
utilized to predict any potential fault conditions induced
by violating the safety limits of protection systems
such as relays. The core of our proposed method is
threefold. First, we adopt the reduced-order model
to describe the dynamics of droop-controlled DER
interface converters (DICs) [21] and DC power-flow
assumptions [22] to speed up the computation time of
our analysis. Next, sensitivity analysis is introduced
to approximate the coupling among dynamic states
and attack inputs. Last but not least, we model
the attack on the measurement as a random variable
for which sensitivity analysis is executed to estimate
the worst-case bounds on all possible variations in
dynamical states. Overall, the reachability analysis
will provide the probabilistic estimation bounds in a
nearly online fashion to quantify the potential impact
of cyber attacks. Therefore, our approach contributes a
systematic solution to estimating the worst-case impact
of cyber attacks on the dynamical behavior of MGs
without applying repeated time-domain simulations or
complex mathematical algorithms. In addition, the
sensitivity evaluation can provide crucial cybersecurity
information to counter attacks on cyber-physical MG
networks by facilitating DER coordination decisions.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Sec.
2 presents the modeling of MGs, while Sec. 3
defines an attack scenario based on corruption of the
voltage measurement and then describes sensitivity
analysis of attacks on dynamical states. In Sec. 4,
we describe how we validate the effectiveness of the
proposed reachability analysis by performing Monte
Carlo simulation. We conclude in Sec. 5.
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Figure 1. A cyber-physical MG network with DICs, in
which Vi,abc and Ii,abc are the instantaneous
three-phase voltage and current measurement sample
values, respectively.
2. Modeling of a Microgrid
Given an islanded MG that includes all grid
components, such as DICs, loads, and lines, as depicted
in Fig. 1, we represent an MG with a connected graph
(NM , EM ). Without loss of generality, the set NM
consists of the subsets ND := {1, · · · , n} and NL :=
{n + 1, · · · ,m}, representing the DIC and load buses,
respectively. In addition, the line segments connecting
the buses are represented by the set EM . Per bus-i,
Vi and θi are defined as the voltage magnitude and
phase angle, respectively, and Vi,abc is the three-phase
instantaneous voltage sample value. Moreover, we let Pi
(Qi) represent the active (reactive) power injection from
DICi, while PMi denotes its active power rating, and P
L
i
(QLi ) is the active (reactive) power demand of the i
th
load bus. For notational convenience in the rest of the
paper, the frequency deviation is represented by ωi :=
(θ˙i − ωref), where θ˙i := dθi/dt is the frequency, and
ωref is the reference frequency set-point. To facilitate
the ensuing reachability analytics, we also make the
following assumptions:
AS 1. The power lines are short, so line loss is
negligible.
AS 2. The angular difference (θi − θj),∀i, j ∈ EM is
small.
AS 3. Each bus voltage magnitude Vi is fixed at near
unity (expressed as per unit).
AS 4. The active power demand PLi ,∀i ∈ NL is
constant during each control interval.
AS 5. All possible load variations under the isolated
MG are supported by DICs without violating the active
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Figure 2. The figurative control diagram representation for an individual DICi.
power rating limits of the DICs.
Assumption 1 is often adopted in the MG literature;
see, e.g., [3, 10, 11, 23, 24]. This assumption can be
justified because of the short power lines in MGs. Thus,
line losses are negligible compared to line flows. In
addition, one can assume that all lines have a uniform
homogeneous resistance-to-inductance ratio, and thus
we can recover a lossless model by performing a linear
transformation to decouple lossy and lossless injections;
see, e.g., [25, Remark 1]. Regarding angular difference
among buses in Assumption 2, these values should be
small due to the proximity of buses within a MG. As
for the constant voltage in Assumption 3, it can be
ensured through the fast inner voltage control loop of
DICs, see, e.g., [26]. Together with the voltage-droop
controller, the DIC output voltage can track the voltage
reference setpoint by managing DICs’ reactive power
output at a much faster time-scale than that of the
frequency controller. Earlier work in [3, 11, 24, 27]
has supported such a time-scale separation between
frequency and voltage dynamics. We also assume that
some active or passive shunt compensators or some
control mechanisms exist throughout the network to
maintain a healthy voltage profile. Henceforth, the
voltage magnitude at each bus can be presumed constant
at nearly unity at the timescale of the frequency control
design. The constant power demand in Assumption 4
comes from the design of the proposed controller to be
sufficiently fast to stabilize the system in response to
a load disturbance before the next disturbance occurs.
Finally, Assumption 5 can be satisfied through careful
system planning at the MG deployment stage. To
sum up, we consider only the reachability analysis
of the frequency control design while neglecting the
voltage arguments from all related functions. Although
we adopt those assumptions to facilitate the ensuing
analysis, the numerical test in Sec. 4 will be based
on a realistic lossy MG model with fully detailed DIC
dynamics that includes the inner voltage and outer
current control loops to showcase the effectiveness of
the proposed analysis.
2.1. Frequency-Based Active Power Control
For an islanded MG, each DICi behaves like a
voltage source by regulating Vi and θi via the feedback
droop-based control; see, e.g., [3, 24, 28]. Fig. 2
depicts a high-order converter model consisting of
fast inner- and outer-control loops and frequency- and
voltage-droop controllers. As the converter’s internal
dynamics are much faster than those of the system states,
it has been shown in [21] that ignoring the former would
neither compromise the modeling fidelity nor affect
the stability conditions of the latter at the time-scale
of power system analysis. Accordingly, we adopt
the reduced-order model (see, e.g., µROm2 in [21])
in this paper. Using Assumption 3, one can derive
the reduced-order dynamic equations per DICi from a
fully detailed converter model by ignoring the voltage
dynamics, as given by
1
ω˜i
dP˜i
dt
= −P˜i + Pi, (1a)
Diωi = P
M
i − P˜i, (1b)
where ω˜i > 0 is the cut-off frequency of the ith low-pass
filter, and P˜i is the filtered active power injection of
DICi. The effect of the low-pass filter is captured
by (1a), while the frequency droop control design is
governed by (1b). Differentiating (1b) from (1a) and
substituting the result into (1a), we have the following
simplified dynamics of the droop-controlled DICi:
dωi
dt
= −ω˜iωi + ω˜i
Di
(PMi − Pi),∀i ∈ ND. (2)
As detailed below in Sec. 3, the sensors at DICi that
measure active power injection Pi are considered to be
potentially vulnerable to malicious attacks. In addition,
note that the frequency deviation ωi at steady-state is a
nonzero value unless PMi = Pi,∀i ∈ ND. Adjusting
the frequency back to the reference set-point requires
an additional control layer (i.e., a secondary frequency
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control design [3,10,24,27]) and is beyond the scope of
this work.
2.2. Load Model
Power loads usually depend on both bus voltage
(which is assumed constant under Assumption 3) and
frequency. Without loss of generality, the load dynamics
can be represented by either a dynamics-free constant
ZIP or a frequency-dependent load model. The former
consists of impedance (i.e., resistor and inductor),
current source, and real and reactive power load (i.e.,
PQ load), while the latter is a frequency-sensitive load,
in which the power consumption increases linearly with
the frequency deviation ωi and its velocity ω˙i, e.g., a
motor-type load [29]. In this work, all loads, unless
specifically stated otherwise, are assumed to be of the
frequency-sensitive type. Therefore, the dynamics is
given by
Jiω˙i +Diωi = −PLi − Pi,∀i ∈ NL, (3)
where Ji > 0 and Di > 0 represent the physical inertia
and damping constant associated with the ith load bus,
respectively [30].
2.3. DC Power Flow
Real and reactive power-flow balance at bus i ∈
NM is described by the following nonlinear algebraic
equations:
0 =
∑
j∈Ni
ViVj (Gij cos(θi − θj) +Bij sin(θk − θj))
− Pi, (4a)
0 =
∑
j∈Ni
ViVj (Gij sin(θi − θj)−Bij cos(θk − θj))
−Qi, (4b)
where Ni := {j | (i, j) ∈ EM} denotes the set of
neighbor buses of bus i, andBij (Gij) is the susceptance
(conductance) of the line between bus i and bus j.
Using Assumptions 1–3 and concatenating all scalars
into vectors, one can simplify (4) to the well-known DC
power flow, as given by
0 = Bθ −P. (5)
By solving (5), we have the explicit solution for the bus
angle
θ = B−1P, (6)
which, together with (2) and (3), gives the power system
differential and algebraic equations.
3. Reachability Analysis
In this section, given attacks on measurement
and control inputs, we develop a methodology for
reachability analysis on dynamical states. We first
describe the data integrity attack model and then propose
a linear sensitivity analysis to approximate the coupling
among dynamic states and attack inputs. All possible
variations of the dynamic state due to attacks can be
effectively determined by a linear transformation that
uses the sensitivity analysis.
3.1. Data Integrity Attacks
Under the assumption that the attacker can access
some of the sensors and communication network to
alter the measurement data or control commands, the
dynamics of the MG network model with two-state DER
dynamics (e.g., angle and frequency) is described by a
set of differential equations as follows:
dxi
dt
= fi(x, uˆ), for i = 1, . . . , 2m, (7)
where x := [θ;ω] ∈ R2m represents the dynamic
states (i.e., angle and frequency), and uˆ ∈ R` collects
the attacked control and measurement inputs. Note
that our MG model does not contain any internal buses
that are without any generations or loads. For a more
general setting in which we have algebraic equations
coupling power-flow balance in the internal buses, we
can also remove those buses by performing network
reduction techniques such as Kron reduction and recover
the differential equations in (7) [31].
Without loss of generality, we define a data integrity
attack as a malicious modification of an original signal
u by the attack input ξ such that
uˆj = (1 + ξj) · uj , for j = 1, . . . , `. (8)
Note that an uncorrupted input signal uˆj is equivalent
to setting ξj = 0. The following example explains
the dynamic equations with attacks on the instantaneous
voltage measurement sample Vi,abc for a simple two-bus
system, as shown in Fig. 3.
Example 1. Fig. 3 illustrates the aforementioned
attack model for the single-line per unit diagram of the
two-bus power system. To better explain the impact of
corrupted measurements on dynamic states, we simplify
the network model by only considering a DIC at bus 1
and a constant PQ load at bus 2, resulting in fewer
dynamic states. Nominal parameters and inputs are
V1 = 1, V2 = 1, XL = 0.15, PL2 = 0.2,
QL2 = 0.1, P
M
1 = 0.3, D1 = 50 [s/rad], and
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Figure 3. Two-bus system (from Example 1) with DER
at bus 1 and a constant PQ load at bus 2.
ω˜1 = 31.4 [rad/s]. All quantities are per-unit unless
otherwise explicitly specified. We assume that the
voltage measurement at bus 1 is corrupted (as denoted
by Vˆ1), so that the attacker alters the true measurements
by the multiplicative scale factor ∆V1, i.e.,
Vˆ1 = (1 + ∆V1) · V1,
and thus corrupts the original droop-based frequency
control scheme. Similar analysis can be applied to
droop-based voltage control design [32]. Note that the
multiplicative attack in (8) on V1,abc is equivalent to
scaling of the phasor voltage magnitude by ∆V1.
Accordingly, the network dynamic equation based on
(7) becomes
dω1
dt
= f1(x, uˆ)
= −ω˜1ω1 + ω˜1
D1
(
PM1 − (1 + ∆V1)PL2
)
. (9)
Note that (9) is a result of DC power flow assumptions
under which θ2 = θ1−PL2 XL. For this simple case, we
have x = ω1 and ξ = ∆V1. 
Remark 1 (Attack Generalizations). In this study, we
model the attack as a malicious multiplier that scales
the true measurement as shown in (8). Nonetheless, our
method is not limited to this specific attack and can be
designed to account for various types of attacks, such as
false data injection, in which attack vectors are added to
the original measurement.
3.2. Linear Approximation and Dynamics of
Sensitivity Variables
Following the dynamic equation of the MG network
in (7), we let x(t, ξ) be the solution of dynamic states
under the attack vector ξ. Hence, the first-order linear
approximation of dynamic states in terms of ξ is
x(t, ξ) ≈ x(t,0) + Φξ, (10)
where x(t,0) is the nominal solution without attacks,
and the matrix Φ ∈ R2m×` with its entry φij := ∂xi∂ξj
accounts for the sensitivity of dynamic states in terms of
the attack vector ξ. Based on our previous work in [33],
we can determine Φ at each instance of time by solving
the following differential equations (see Appendix A for
details):
d
dt
Φ = Λx
∣∣∣
ξ=0
Φ + Λξ
∣∣∣
ξ=0
, (11)
where Λx and Λξ are the Jacobian of f in terms of
x and ξ, respectively. As our MG model does not
contain any internal buses, we do not have algebraic
terms or algebraic sensitivity equations corresponding
to the dynamics of internal buses. We refer readers
to [33] for cases in which we included algebraic terms to
incorporate the effectiveness of the attack on power-flow
balance in the internal network. By solving (11) together
with the original dynamic equations in (7) for ξ = 0 at
each time t, we would obtain the value of x(t,0) as well
as the time-varying sensitivity matrix Φ.
The following example depicts the linear
approximation of a state and the formulation of
sensitivity equations for the two-bus system continued
from Example 1.
Example 2 (Example 1 continued). The matrix Φ
in (10) for the linear approximation of the dynamic state
x in terms of the attack ξ is given by
Φ =
∂ω1
∂∆V1
. (12)
Thus, the nominal solution for the state is determined
by solving (9) under ξ = 0. Based on the formulation
of sensitivity equations (11), we obtain the relevant
matrices as follows.
Λx
∣∣∣
ξ=0
= −ω˜1, Λξ
∣∣∣
ξ=0
= − ω˜1P
L
2
D1
.
We can calculate the sensitivity matrix Φ by
solving (11), and we can subsequently complete
the linear approximation in (10). 
As detailed subsequently, we propagate the attack
ξ drawn from some probability distribution functions
to estimate the probabilistic bounds on all possible
variations of x(t, ξ) due to the attack ξ.
Remark 2 (Approximation Errors). Neglecting the
higher-order terms leads to an approximation error
in (11). It is possible to improve accuracy at
the cost of additional computational burden by
incorporating such higher-order terms, e.g., 2nd-order
and mixed-sensitivity terms as discussed in [33]. That
enhancement is beyond the scope of this paper and will
be a future research direction.
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3.3. Probabilistic Worst-Case Bounds on
Dynamic States
We describe the jth attack, ξj , as a probabilistic
random variable with normal distribution, i.e.,
ξj ∼ N (0, σ2j ), and individual attacks are mutually
independent. Without loss of generality, an offline
comprehensive study of all possible undetectable attack
scenarios is assumed and thus justifies the probabilistic
attack model. Then, based on (10), the ith state under
the attack, xi(t, ξ), also follows a normal distribution
with a mean value of xi(t,0) and a variance given by
the sum of variances of ξ scaled by sensitivity variables,
{φij}`j=1, i.e.,
xi(t, ξ) ∼ N
xi(t,0),∑`
j=1
φ2ijσ
2
j
 , (13)
which provides normally distributed worst-case bounds
on the state xi for the given attack ξ. The following
example demonstrates probabilistic worst-case bounds
on dynamic states for the two-bus power system
continued from Examples 1 and 2.
Example 3 (Examples 1 and 2 continued). In this
example, the multiplicative attack ξ is described in
terms of normally distributed random variables with
zero mean values,
ξ = ∆V1 ∼ N (0, σ1) ,
with standard deviations σ1 = 5. We let the initial
condition at t = 0 be ω1(0) = 377.9991 [rad/s]
disturbed from the normal operating point. Accordingly,
the worst-case bounds on the dynamic state are
determined from (13) by calculating x(t,0) and Φ at
each time t in Examples 1 and 2. The result is shown
in Fig. 4. Red and blue curves show the estimated
worst-case upper and lower bounds, respectively. Each
curve indicates confidence levels of 99.7%, 95%, and
68% around the nominal trajectory denoted by black
dotted lines. We verified the result via repeated
time-domain simulations (denoted by green lines) for
100 randomly sampled attack values drawn from the
normal distribution.
Remark 3 (Scalability). Thanks to Assumptions 1–5,
the reduced-order DIC models introduced in Sec. 2, and
the probabilistic attack description in (13), the proposed
reachability analysis shows computational advantages
over prior solutions while maintaining fair accuracy, and
thus it can be adopted for larger MGs. As a comparison
with [33] regarding scalability, the full MG dynamics is
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
t [sec]
376.8
377
377.2
377.4
377.6
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Figure 4. Worst-case bounds on the dynamic state x
for the two-bus system (from Examples 1–3). Red and
blue curves show the estimated worst-case upper and
lower bounds, respectively, with different confidence
levels, i.e., 99.7%, 95%, and 68%, around the nominal
trajectory denoted by the black dotted lines. In
addition, 100 repeated time-domain simulations,
denoted by green lines, are also plotted to verify the
effectiveness of the reachability analysis.
simplified to an ordinary differential equation (2), while
the worst-case bounds are described by probabilistic
distributions that do not resort to convex optimization.
As detailed in the following section, our approach would
significantly improve the scalability of the proposed
method.
4. Numerical Tests
We have showcased the application of our proposed
approach to quantify the impact of attacks on
measurements based on the reachability analysis
outlined in Sec. 3. We now consider a more realistic
lossy MG model composed of three DICs governed
by the droop-controlled scheme in the low-voltage
distribution network. Fig. 5 provides a one-line diagram
of the MG model under investigation. The system
reference frequency ωref = 377 rad · s−1. The local
control in the primary level works with a sampling rate
of 20 kHz, which is needed to maintain a good output
power quality, e.g., minimal frequency harmonics. For
ease of observation, we set the rating of all DICs to
the same value of 2 kW while fixing the droop gain
uniformly as 50 kW · s · rad−1. The dynamic load at
bus 4 has the inertia constant J4 = 0.005 s · rad−2,
the damping constant D4 = 10 s · rad−1, and the
nominal apparent power demand S4 = 1.5 kW +
j0.525 kvar. Meanwhile, the MG is warm-started
and initially operated at steady-state. In addition, the
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Figure 5. One-line diagram of the MG model for the
numerical demonstration of our proposed method.
Three droop-controlled DICs are connected to one load
through the low-voltage distribution network.
probabilistic worst-case bounds are estimated at the
beginnings of successive intervals of 2 seconds(s), at
which times all parameters, including load demands
and attack distribution, are known and remain constant
during the time interval. Last, we introduce a 100% load
increase at t = 2 s to further evaluate the effectiveness
of the proposed analysis. Physical details of the MG,
including inner-voltage and outer-current control loops
and pulse width modulation emulation, are included and
implemented in MATLAB Simulink®.
As for the reachability analysis, the dynamics
of DICs are described by the simplified model as
shown in (2). Dynamical states, including phase
angles and frequencies of all DERs, are denoted by
x = [θ1, ω1, θ2, ω2, θ3, ω3]
T. Also, we assume that
Assumptions 1–5 are satisfied in our MG model,
and thus the power-flow balance in the network is
represented by the DC power flow; see Sec. 2.3.
Under a multiplicative attack on the voltage
measurement V2 at DIC2, we estimate the probabilistic
worst-case bounds on all DIC frequencies. We model
the attack on the voltage measurement of the DIC2,
denoted by ξ = ∆V2, as a normally distributed random
variable with zero mean and the standard deviation σ2 =
0.5. Thus, the voltage measurement is scaled by the
attack as in (8). Consequently, the power injection
calculation P2 is maliciously corrupted from the true
sample value. Subsequently, we evaluate (11) to get the
sensitivity variable Φ in (10) at each time t as
Φ =
[
∂θ1
∂∆V2
,
∂ω1
∂∆V2
,
∂θ2
∂∆V2
,
∂ω2
∂∆V2
,
∂θ3
∂∆V2
,
∂ω3
∂∆V2
]T
.
Matrices and vectors required for the sensitivity
equations (11) are given by
Λx =

0 1 0 0 0 0
− ω˜1(
∑3
i=2 Bii)
D1
−ω˜1 ω˜1B22D1 0 ω˜1B33D1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
ω˜2B22
D2
0 − ω˜2B22D2 −ω˜2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
ω˜3B33
D3
0 0 0 − ω˜3B33D3 −ω˜3

,
Λξ =
[
0, 0, 0,− ω˜2P2
D2
, 0, 0
]T
,
where both Λx and Λξ are evaluated at ξ = 0. With the
nominal values of the frequency calculated by solving
the reduced-order dynamic equations of the MG, we can
determine probabilistic worst-case bounds on all DIC
frequencies by following the equation in (13).
Fig. 6 shows the results of the estimated bounds
for all DIC frequencies. In each part of the figure,
upper and lower bounds (denoted by red and blue
lines) are plotted for different confidence levels (i.e.,
99.7%, 95%, and 68%, corresponding to 1, 2, and 3
standard deviations) with black dotted lines representing
nominal trajectories without the attack. Green lines are
trajectories obtained from 100 Monte Carlo simulations
of the original nonlinear MG model with fully detailed
DIC dynamics. Compared to the repeated simulation
results, we can verify that the estimated bounds on the
frequency of the proposed method accurately describe
the worst-case system dynamics due to the potential
attack. The bound estimate is instrumental for providing
countermeasures by facilitating DER coordination under
adversarial environments. Our approach supports use
cases involving multi-microgrid environments, in which
peer MGs with some interconnecting tie lines and a
power sharing agreement can support critical loads in
response to an adverse condition. For example, we
consider the two-MG system shown in Fig. 7. Both
MGs have a main MG bus and a critical load bus,
with normally open inter-ties between these buses. We
assume that the systems are in island mode. The
reachability analysis indicates that an unsafe state is
reachable because of a likely voltage attack at the DIC
on the critical load bus in MG 1 (Event 1 and 2). We
let the MG controllers exchange messages, with our
implementation eventually using OpenFMB/DDS1 [34].
1OpenFMB is an emerging grid edge communication standard
to enable grid edge interoperability. Another research thrust of the
project that supports the work described in the present paper is
considering OpenFMB communications across local area networks
(for example, between peer microgrids) over software-defined
networks (SDN). The eventual goal of the work is to unify
the reachability analysis, frequency stabilization, and secure
inter-microgrid OpenFMB messaging as an OpenFMB use case.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 6. Simulation results of the MG are plotted for
frequencies at DIC buses 1–3 (figures (a)–(c),
respectively). Upper and lower bounds for different
confidence levels are denoted by red and blue lines.
Nominal trajectories (i.e., without any attack) are
represented by black dotted lines. Green lines are the
results from 100 repeated simulations based on the
original fully detailed MG model.
Table 1. Computation Time for different network sizes.
Case Number of ComputationDICs attacks time [s]
13 Bus 3 2 0.02
34 Bus 9 6 0.04
123 Bus 30 10 0.2325 1.1
In response to the reachability analysis (Event 2), the
controllers reach consensus to close the tie line, and MG
1 trips off the faulted DER. The secondary frequency
control algorithm quickly stabilizes the now connected
two-MG system (Event 3).
In addition, the result proves that our approach is
computationally efficient compared to other methods
based on repeated numerical simulations such as Monte
Carlo methods. Computation for the bound estimation
took 0.0286 s for a 2 s interval to estimate the worst-case
probabilistic bounds. Computing the Monte Carlo
simulation over the same interval required 2200 s on
a 2.53 GHz Intel® Processor, demonstrating that our
proposed method has computational advantages over
repeated numerical simulations and can be implemented
in a nearly online fashion. To further validate the
scalability of the proposed reachability analysis for large
MGs, we compare computation times of a 2 s interval
for estimating probabilistic bounds under different IEEE
distribution feeder test cases (i.e., 13-bus, 34-bus,
and 123-bus with arbitrary DIC locations), as shown
in Table 1. Note that computation time increases with
the network size and the number of attacks. As a MG
typically consists of a few buses and DICs, these results
show that the proposed method is suitable for nearly
real-time MG stability-monitoring applications.
However, our method leads to over estimation in
some cases (as shown in Fig. 6(a)), mainly because
of errors from the linear approximation in (10). Also,
some of the large transients at t = 2 s (reflecting
load step-change) are not effectively captured by the
bounds as a consequence of the simplified assumptions
of our MG model. To improve the accuracy, we
can incorporate higher-order terms in the analysis
as discussed in [33, 35], adopt more accurate MG
models (refer to different reduced-order DIC models
in [21]), and consider the original nonlinear power-flow
equations to capture the accurate transient phenomena at
the cost of computational resources.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we focused on developing a
systematic framework to analyze the cybersecurity
Page 3521
VV
Figure 7. One-line diagram and sequence of operations for the two-MG system under a potential malicious attack.
impact on a microgrid in the presence of malicious
attacks on measurement and control commands. We
proposed a computationally efficient method to estimate
probabilistic worst-case bounds on dynamic states
under potential attacks. In addition, we were able
to achieve computational advantages over exhaustive
simulation-based methods, while accurately describing
the worst-case system behavior. Consequently, we
anticipate that the proposed approach will be useful in
multiple contexts, e.g., in online stability monitoring
against cyber attacks and in providing advisory
information to microgrid operators to effectively
coordinate DERs in a system.
The remaining shortcomings of our method include
over estimated results due to errors from the linear
approximation and failures to capture large transients
of the dynamics as a result of the simplified microgrid
model. To address those challenges in our future
work, we plan to incorporate higher-order terms in the
approximation and adopt different levels of model-order
reduction to improve the accuracy of the analysis while
minimizing computational burden. Furthermore, we
will validate the performance of the event sequence
introduced in Fig. 7 with a real-time simulator while
extending our analysis by introducing new elements,
such as protection devices and other hierarchical control
schemes (e.g., secondary frequency control).
Appendix
A. Derivation of Sensitivity Equations
Assume that the network dynamics in (7) are
continuously differentiable with respect to (x, ξ), and
that there exists a unique solution for the nominal states,
xi(t,0), at each instance. Then the solution of the ith
state for a given ξ is given as:
xi(t, ξ) = xi(t0,0) +
∫ t
τ=t0
fi(x, ξ)dτ. (14)
Taking partial derivatives of (14) in terms of ξj , we have:
∂xi
∂ξj
=
∫ t
τ=t0
m∑
k=1
∂fi
∂xk
∂xk
∂ξj
+
∂fi
∂ξj
dτ. (15)
By taking a derivative of (15) in terms of t, we get:
d
dt
φij =
m∑
k=1
∂fi
∂xk
∣∣∣
ξ=0
φij +
∂fi
∂ξj
∣∣∣
ξ=0
(16)
Collecting (16) ∀i, j, we can express the compact matrix
form shown in (11).
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